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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF
SPEECH-CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS-" SON OF SAM" LAWs-A
content-based financially burdensome speech restriction that is not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest is inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board; et al., US , 112 S Ct 501, (1991).
In 1977, in response to public outrage over the sale of rights to
the story concerning, the crimes of serial killer David Berkowitz,'
the New York Legislature enacted New York Executive Law sec-
tion 632-a 2 ("Son of Sam Law").' The law requires those who con-
tract with an accused or convicted person for the rights to publish
or produce a story of the crime to submit, to the Crime Victims
Board ("Board"), a copy of the contract." The accused or convicted
1. Simon &. Schuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crimes Victims
Board, 724 F Supp 170 (SDNY 1989). Citing New York legislative history, the district court
noted the statement of New York State Senator Emmanuel R. Gold, the bill's sponsor:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as the
forty-four calibre killer, can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once
he is captured-while five people are dead, other people were injured as a result of
his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal situations, the victim
must be more important than the criminal.
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 724 F Supp at 174.
2. 1977 NY Laws 823, 1978 NY Laws 417, 1986 NY Laws 74, 1991 NY Laws 379, NY
Exec Law §632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp 1992).
3. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 724 F Supp at 173-4. The law's popular name is derived
from the name given to serial killer David Berkowitz, the "Son of Sam," who sold the rights
to the story concerning his crimes. Id.
4. NY Exec Law §632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp 1992). Section 632-a(1)
provides:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity con-
tracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, accused or
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:401
person cannot directly receive any payments that he is entitled to
under the contract, however, because the statute requires that such
income payments must be made to the Board.5 The Board is re-
quired to deposit the payment in an escrow account, with said
funds to be made available to both the victims of the crime who
have recovered money judgments in civil actions against the crimi-
nal and to the criminal's other creditors.' The Son of Sam Law
defines "persons convicted of a crime" in terms broad enough to
include within the statute's coverage persons who, in a book or
other work, merely admit to a crime but are not convicted of that
crime.7
In 1981, Simon & Schuster sought to publish a book detailing
organized crime in New York City.8 As a result, in August 1981,
Henry Hill, 9 an admitted organized crime figure, contracted with
convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by
way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or
television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such
accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such
crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board and pay over to the board
any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person
so accused or convicted or his representatives. The board shall deposit such moneys
in an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim or the legal repre-
sentative of any victim of crimes committed by: (i). such convicted person; or (ii) by
such accused person, but only if such accused person is eventually convicted of the
crime and provided that such victim, within five years of the date of the establish-
ment of such escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction
and recovers a money judgment for damages against such person or his
representative.
NY Exec Law §632-a(1).
5. Id.
6. NY Exec Law §632-a(11) (McKinney 1982 & Supp 1991). Subparagraphs (c) and
(d) read as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, claims on moneys in the escrow account
shall have the following priorities: . . .(c) Civil judgments of the victims of the crime;
(d) Other judgment creditors or persons claiming moneys through the person accused
or convicted of a crime who present lawful claims, including state or local government
tax authorities.
NY Exec Law §632-a(11)(c), (d).
7. NY Exec Law §632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp 1992). Subparagraph (b)
reads:
A person convicted of a crime shkll include any person conyicted of a crime in this
state either by entr'y of a plea of guilty or by conviction after trial and any person
who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which
such person is not prosecuted.
NY Exec Law §632-a(10)(b).
8. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 724 F Supp'at 172.
9. In 1980, Henry Hill, after being arrested on charges of conspiracy to sell drugs,
cooperated with the federal government and was placed in the Federal Witness Protection
Program. Id.
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author Nicholas Pileggi for a book about Hill's life. 10 Subsequently,
a publishing agreement between Hill and Pileggi and Simon &
Schuster, providing for payments to be made to both Hill and
Pileggi, was signed." Hill and Pileggi's collaboration resulted in
the January 1986 publication of the book entitled Wiseguy: Life in
a Mafia Family ("Wiseguy"). 2 The book describes Henry Hill's
involvement with organized crime in New York City and through-
out the book Hill admits to having participated in a variety of
crimes.
13
'When the Crime Victims Board learned of Wiseguy soon after it
was published, they ordered Simon & Schuster to furnish copies of
any contracts it had entered into with Hill, to provide information
regarding the payments it had made to Hill, and to cease making
any further payments to Hill. 4 Simon & Schuster complied with
the Board's order; however, they had already paid Hill's. literary
agent $96,250 in advances and royalties on Hill's behalf, and were
holding $27,958 for eventual payment to Hill. 5 The Board re-
viewed the book and contract, and determined (1) the book was
covered by section 632-a of the Executive Law, and (2) Simon &
Schuster violated the law when they failed to submit their contract
with Hill to the Crime Victims Board and made payments directly
to Hill.16 When the Board ordered Hill to turn over the payment
he had already received, and ordered Simon & Schuster to turn
over all money payable to Hill at the time or in the future, 7 Simon
& Schuster brought suit against the members of the Board under
42 USC section 1983,18 seeking a declaration that New York Exec-
10. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board,
112 S Ct 501, 506 (1991).
11. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 506.
12. Nicholas Pileggi, Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family (Simon & Schuster 1986)
("Wiseguy"). The book was produced into the movie, Goodfellas (Warner Bros. 1990).
13. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Fischetti, 916 F2d 777, 779 (2d Cir 1990). In Wiseguy,
Hill describes, among other crimes, a nearly six million dollar theft from the Lufthansa
terminal at Kennedy Airport and the bribery of college basketball players. Id at 779.
14. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 507.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Simon & Schuster, Inc. 916 F2d at 780. Simon & Schuster was notified of the
Board's findings on June 15, 1987 via a Notice and Proposed Determination and Order is-
sued by the Board. Id. The order became a Final Determination and Order on July 15, 1987
after Simon & Schuster failed to challenge the Notice and Order issued by the Board. Id.
18. 42 USC §1983 (1982) provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
1993
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:401
utive Law section 632-a violated the First Amendment"9 and an
injunction barring its enforcement.2 0 In the United States District
Court, Southern District New York, Simon & Schuster moved for
summary judgment 2 and defendant Crime Victims Board cross-
motioned for same.22 The district court, in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant Crime Victims Board, concluded
that New York Executive Law section 632-a regulates only the au-
thor or publisher's non-expressive activity, and that any incidental
effect that the Son of Sam Law may have on First Amendment
rights is outweighed by the important interest the New York Leg-
islature has in compensating victims of crimes.2 s The United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion, concluding that section 632-a was constitutional because it
was narrowly tailored to fit the compelling state interest of com-
pensating victims of crime.24
The United States Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals.25 The Supreme Court
determined that the Son of Sam Law was a content-based statute,
and, as such, the First Amendment presumptively placed the type
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 USC § 1983.
19. US Const, Amend I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id.
20. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 507-08.
21. Summary judgment is a motion requested by a party "if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FRCP 56(c).
22. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 724 F Supp at 180.
23. Id at 179.
24. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 916 F2d at 784-87. Of note is the dissenting opinion of
Judge Jon 0. Newman. Judge Newman concluded that the Son of Sam Law does not with-
stand the strict scrutiny test. Id at 784. He objected to the majority's conclusion, via their
analysis that equated the state interest with the statute's scope, that the statute is narrowly
tailored to achieve the State's objective. Id at 785. In addition, he rejects victim outrage and
victim compensation as compelling interests. Id at 786. Further, Judge Newman contended
that the statute is underinclusive. Id. Finally, he suggested that the solution to insuring
restitution to crime victims may lie in broadening New York's already existing attachment
remedies. Id.
25. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 512. Justice O'Connor delivered the unani-
mous (8-0) decision of the Court. Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision. Id.
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of restrictions it imposed beyond the legislative power of Con-
gress.2" The Court stressed the importance of avoiding a restriction
that causes a "chilling effect," driving viewpoints or ideas from the
marketplace.27
Further, the Supreme Court addressed several specific argu-
ments raised by the Board. First, the .Court rejected the Board's
attempt to distinguish the Son of Sam Law, which escrows the
speaker's income for a limited amount of time (five years), from an
Arkansas statute, reviewed by the Court in Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject, Inc v Ragland, Commissioner of Revenue of Arkansas, 8 that
imposed an outright percentage tax on receipts from sales of tangi-
ble personal property."9 The Board sought to make such a distinc-
tion because the Supreme Court, in Arkansas Writers' Project,
concluded that the subject tax violated the First Amendment free
press guarantee. 30 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this par-
ticular argument of the Board, re.cognizing the statutes in both
cases as financial regulations operating as disincentives to speak.
3 1
Second, the Board argued that for discriminatory financial treat-
ment to be considered suspect under the First Amendment, illicit
legislative intent to suppress certain ideas is a requisite.3" The
Court, quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v Minnesota
Commissioner. of Revenue,"3 reiterated that "illicit legislative in-
tent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment."34
Additionally, the Board asserted that because the Son of Sam
Law did not target the media, but instead applied to any "entity,"
it did not violate the First Amendment protection granted the me-
dia from content based financial regulation.35 The Court, however,
dismissed this contention, stating, "[t]he Government's power to
impose content-based financial disincentives on speech surely does
not vary with the identity of the speaker."3
26. Id at 508.
27. Id.
28. 481 US 221 (1987).
29. Id at 224. The statute in question, the Arkansas Gross Receipts Act, specified
exemptions that included, in part, newspapers and "religious, professional, trade and sport
journals and/or publications printed and published within this State." Id.
30. Id at 233.
31. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 508.
32. Id at 509.
33. 460 US 575 (1983).
34. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 509 citing Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 592.




Before reaching the conclusion that the provisions of section
632-a were inconsistent with the First Amendment, however, the
Court applied a "compelling interest" analysis to the facts of the
case.3 7 The Court conceded that although the state's interests in
ensuring both that criminals do not profit from their crimes and
that crime victims receive compensation from those who do them
harm are compelling, classifying a criminal's assets (i.e. attaching
the profits from "storytelling" to the exclusion of all other forms of
income) does not achieve that objective.38 The Court reasoned that
the State's interest in assigning the proceeds of crime to the victim
is unrelated to the distinction between income from storytelling
and other income. 9 In addition, the wording of the statute ° re-
garding the works to which it applies, combined with the statute's
broad definition of "person convicted of a crime"'" results in a
statute that is overinclusive. "2
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that:
[I]n the Son of Sam Law, New York has singled out speech on a particular
subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other
income. The State's interest in compensating victims from the fruits of
crime is a compelling one, but the Son of Sam Law is not narrowly tailored
to advance that objective. As a result, the statute is inconsistent with the
First Amendment.
4'
Justice Blackmun concurred in the opinion, but thought it nec-
essary for the Court, because most other states have similar legisla-
tion, to provide future guidance by stating that the statute was
underinclusive as well as overinclusive."
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, while agree-
ing with the decision of the Court, excepted to the "compelling in-
37. Id at 509-11.
38. Id at 510. In Arkansas Writers' Project, the Supreme Court refused to accept as
"compelling" such interests as raising revenue, fostering communication, and encouraging
fledgling publishers because those interests were unrelated to a press/non-press categoriza-
tion. Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 US at 231-32.
39. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 510.
40. NY Exec Law §632-(a)(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp 1992) (cited in note 4).
41. NY Exec Law §632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp 1991) (cited in note 7).
42. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 511. By way of illustration, the Court cites,
inter alia, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, The Confessions of St. Augustine, and Civil
Disobedience, by Henry David Thoreau, as works which would be subject to the restrictions
imposed by the Son of Sam Law. Id. See also Appendix to Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf
of the Association of American Publishers, Inc. for a comprehensive list of titles that the
Association of American Publishers maintains would be subject to the law's restrictions.
43. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 512.
44. Id (Blackmun concurring).
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terest" analysis utilized by the Court as unnecessary and incor-
rect.45 He asserted that the First Amendment protection of speech
and the press forbids such restrictions as those imposed by section
632-a,46 that the statute's provisions "amount[s] to raw censor-
ship," '47  and consequently, is inconsistent with the First
Amendment.48
The First Amendment, together with the nine other amend-
ments comprising the Bill of Rights, became effective on December
15, 1791.11 It was not until 1925, however, that First Amendment
guarantees were applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.50 Since that time, the Court,
when reviewing a governmental action that restricts a First
Amendment freedom, has distinguished between those statutes
that are content-neutral but which in some way affect the right of
free speech, 51 and those statutes that are content-based.2 Content-
based restrictions are those that have a direct communicative im-
pact."3 For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council,5 4 a statute banning pharmacists'
advertising of prescription drug prices was held by the Court to
45. Id at 512 (Kennedy concurring). Justice Kennedy stated:
The New York statute we now consider imposes severe restrictions on authors and
publishers, using as its sole criterion the content of what is written. The regulated
content has the full protection of the First Amendment and this, I submit, is itself a
full and sufficient reason for holding the statute unconstitutional. In my view it is
both unnecessary and incorrect to ask whether a State can show that the statute "is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end."
Id.
46. Id at 512.
47. Id at 515.
48. Id.
49. Joseph J. Hemmer, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment at 1 (Praeger,
1986).
50. Gitlow v People of New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925).
51. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, §12-2, (The Foundation Press,
Inc. 2d ed 1988). Tribe categorizes this form of abridgement as governmental actions that
adversely affect communication, but are aimed at non-communicative impact. Id at 789. For
example, in Schneider v State, 308 US 147 (1939), the plaintiff was barred from distributing
religious literature door-to-door because of a municipal ordinance, enacted to control litter-
ing, that prohibited the distribution of literature within the town unless a license was ob-
tained in advance. In Schneider, the Court held that even though the aim of the ordinance
was the control of.littering, the ordinance acted as a form of censorship because it restricted
the dissemination of ideas. Schneider, 308 US at 147. See also Martin v Struthers, 319 US
141 (1943) and Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77 (1949).
52. Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-2 at 789-90 (cited in note 51).
53. Id at 790.
54. 425 US 748 (1976).
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violate the First Amendment because the Virginia Statute "
singles out speech of a particular content and seeks to prevent its
dissemination completely. '""
In some cases, the categorization of a restriction as content-
based or content neutral is in itself an arguable issue. In City of
Renton et al v Playtime Theaters, Inc. et al,6 a zoning ordinance
that restricted adult movie theaters from locating near residential
zones was determined to be content-neutral because the ordinance
targeted not the content of the films, but the "secondary effects"
of the films on the community. 7 Further, the Court concluded that
the ordinance-was not being used by the City of Renton to sup-
press expression.58 Similarly, in Ward et al v Rock Against Ra-
cism,59 a New York City regulation, enacted to control noise levels
by requiring performers using the Central Park bandshell to utilize
sound amplification equipment and a sound technician provided
by the city, was ascertained to be content-neutral because the
city's desire to control the level of noise at an event had nothing to
do with content.6 0 In Ward, the Court declared that "the principal
inquiry in determining content-neutral speech cases generally, and
time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the govern-
ment has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys. 61 Thus, the analysis the Court ap-
plies to test the validity of a statute that burdens free speech de-
pends upon how the Court has first classified the restriction. 2
When a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction is at
issue, the Court will assess the regulation to determine if it is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest and if
alternative channels of communication have remained open. 3
When a content-based restriction is implicated, the Court recog-
nizes several distinct classifications of speech: 1) a pre-established
unprotected area of speech; 4 2) speech given limited First Amend-
55. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 US at 771. See also Consolidated Edison
v Public Service Commission, 447 US 530 (1980); Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971); and
Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919).
56. 475 US 41 (1985).
57. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 US at 47.
58. Id at 54.
59. 491 US 781 (1989).
60. Ward, 491 US at 784-92.
61. Id at 791 citing Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288, 295
(1984).
62. Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-2 at 791-92 (cited in note 51).
63. Metromedia, Inc. v San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981).
64. Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, in sustaining a
Vol. 31:401
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ment protection; 5 and 3) speech that is given full First Amend-
ment protection. 8
The Supreme Court has consistently implied that content-based
restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional," hence, regula-
tions impacting speech that has full First Amendment protection
are subject to exacting or strict scrutiny. 8 In Carey v Brown, the
Court, addressing a challenge to an Illinois statute that prohibited
residential picketing, applied the same standard of careful scrutiny
they utilize when reviewing an Equal Protection issue, i.e, requir-
ing that the regulation be narrowly tailored to achieve a substan-
tial governmental interest.6 9 In a later case, Boos v Barry,70 the
Court required a strict scrutiny analysis for a content-based re-
striction on political speech in a public forum when they addressed
a challenge to a Washington, DC statute that prohibited the dis-
breach of the peace conviction based on the "fighting words" doctrine, the Court
maintained:
There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problems. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or fighting words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of peace.
Chaplinsky, 315 US at 571-72.
The categories of speech recognized as unprotected by the First Amendment include: (1)
advocacy of illegal conduct, see Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971), Brandenburg v Ohio,
395 US 444 (1969); (2) obscenity, see Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973), and child por-
nography, see New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982); and (3) "fighting words," see
Chaplinsky.
65. The categories of speech afforded limited First Amendment protection include:
(1) commercial speech, see Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809 (1975), Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748 (1976); (2) near obscene
speech , see Erznoznik v Jacksonville, 422 US 205 (1975), Young v American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 US 50 (1976); (3) private speech of employees, see Connick v Myers, 461 US
138 (1983); and (4) defamation, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
US 749 (1985).
66. Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Sur-
vive First Amendment Challenge, 66 Notre Dame L Rev 1075, 1082-84 (1991).
67. Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92 (1972) ("But above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage; its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.") Mosley, 408 US at 95, and Regan v Time
Inc., 468 US 641 (1984) ("Regulations which permit the government to discriminate on the
basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.") Re-
gan, 468 US at 648-49.
68. Carey v Brown et al, 447 US 455, 461-62 (1980).
69. Carey, 447 US at 461-62. However, see Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S Ct
501, 512, objecting to a strict scrutiny analysis when a content-based regulation is at issue.
Id at 512. See also note 45 and accompanying text.
70. 485 US 312 (1988).
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play, within a specified distance of foreign embassies, of signs criti-
cizing foreign governments. 7 1 In Boos v Barry, the Court, citing
Perry Education Assn. v Perry Local Educator's Assn.,72 stated:
... Thus, we have required the State to show that the 'regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end.' ,,73
Further, in a line of cases including Minneapolis Star v Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue, 4 the Court has strictly scrutinized
content-based regulations that financially burden free speech. The
Minneapolis Star case concerned a Minnesota regulation that im-
posed a use tax on the cost of paper and ink products used in the
production of periodic publications. 75 The Court required the state
to show an overriding governmental interest that necessitated the
tax.76 Later, in Arkansas Writers' Project, it was determined that
the statute at issue (taxing general interest magazines while ex-
empting newspapers, religious, professional and sports journals,
among others) failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny test because the
state did not satisfy its heavy burden of proving a compelling state
interest, narrowly drawn to achieve the desired end.77 Thus, in or-
der for a content-based speech restrictive statute to survive a First
Amendment challenge, it is apparent that the Supreme Court re-
quires that the statute be shown to be necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.78
In spite of the varied arguments advanced in the subject case by
both the petitioner (Simon & Schuster) and the respondent (Crime
Victims Board), as well as those raised in amicus briefs, the Su-
preme Court kept its decision within narrow confines. It concluded,
with very little discussion or explanation, that the restrictions im-
posed by the New York statute were content-based, and as such,
were subject to strict or exacting scrutiny. Thus, the Supreme
Court relegated to one footnote a major portion of the Board's ar-
gument that the New York statute was subject to a less exacting
standard of review than strict scrutiny because it was content-neu-
71. Boos, 485 US at 321.
72. 460 US 37 (1983).
73. Boos v Barry, 485 US at 321.
74. 460 US 575 (1983).
75. Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 578.
76. Id at 584. The Court concluded that the State did not meet its burden. Id at 593.
77. Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 US at 234. See notes 28-30 and accompanying
text.
78. Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 270 (regulation must be narrowly drawn and
necessary to serve a compelling state interest) Widmar, 454 US at 270.
Vol. 31:401
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tral under the decisions in Ward v Rock and Renton v Playtime
Theatres.79 Further, the Court overlooked an interesting argument,
in support of the Crime Victims Board, raised by the Crime Vic-
tims Legal Clinic in their amicus brief. The brief for the legal clinic
proposed, as was recently done in the area of child pornography, 0
that a new category of unprotected speech ("pernicious profiteer-
ing") be established.81 Placing the criminal's speech in an unpro-
tected category would compel the Court to apply the standard of
review established in United States v O'Brien,82 a more relaxed
standard than strict scrutiny, thus allowing for some regulation of
criminal speech.8
In the text of its opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that they
granted certiorari in the subject case because, evidenced by the
fact that most states as well as the federal government have en-
acted statutes similar in content and objective to the New York
laws, this case addressed a significant issue that was likely to re-
cur." In addition, within the text of the opinion, the Court ex-
pressly refrained from determining the constitutionality of those
similar state statutes. 5 By so firmly declaring (i.e., an unanimous
8-0 decision) that the New York regulation was content-based,
however, the Court has effectively neutralized most, if not all, of
the other state statutes because those statutes are aimed at crimi-
nal speech.,
Further, by holding that the Son of Sam Law is a content-based
statute not narrowly drawn to achieve its objective, the Court has
79. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 511 n 1.
80. New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982).
81. Brief, Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent: The Crime' Victims Legal Clinic,
at LEXIS 169, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board, 112 SCt 501, No 90-1059, October Term 1990 (1991).
82. 391 US 367 (1965). The O'Brien case (addressing a regulation prohibiting the de-
struction of draft cards) distinguished between speech and non-speech activities. The case
held that a law that places an incidental burden on free speech may be adjudged constitu-
tional if: 1) its enactment is within the legislative power of the government; 2) it furthers an
important government interest; 3) it is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
4) the restriction is no greater than necessary to achieve the governmental interest. O'Brien,
391 US at 376.
83. Brief, Amicus Curiae for Respondent, at LEXIS 166, Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112
SCt 501 (1991). Cited in note 81.
84. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S Ct at 508.
85. Id at 512.
86. Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and Press
Clauses, 70 NC L Rev 493 (1992). The author has summarized the various and common
characteristics of the "Son of Sam" laws of the federal government and the forty-three
states. Epps, 70 NC L Rev at 496.
1993
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implied that a more narrowly drawn statute that is not based on
speech content will be an acceptable alternative. Indeed, Ronald S.
Rauchberg, the Counsel of Record for Simon & Schuster who ar-
gued the case before the Supreme Court, conceded that a general
law, attaching all income of a convicted criminal for the benefit of
the victim, would be content-neutral, and thus, might be able to
survive a First Amendment challenge.87 If this, then, is the course
that the states follow, a new set of issues will be generated that
may require review by the Supreme Court. For instance, even
under a less exacting standard of scrutiny, a regulation must still
be shown to be necessary to achieve the state's goal.s8
Questions arise as to the necessity of a Son of Sam Law where
other laws, already proven effective, are available to protect vic-
tims' interests 9 and when the record clearly shows that the Son
Sam of Laws have had a very limited effect.90 Further, it may be
argued that the statutes are still either underinclusive9' or overin-
clusive,92 or both. It may also be argued that statutes that are writ-
ten to make the funds in the accounts available to creditors of the
criminal, other than his victims, lessen the importance of the gov-
ernment's interest in compensating victims of crime.
Following the decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded to the
Court of Appeals of New York for further consideration, the case
of Children of Bedford, Inc. v Petromelis.93 Like the Simon &
Schuster case, Children of Bedford addressed a First Amendment
challenge to section 632-a. In this case, the object of the Crime
87. Lyle Denniston, "Son of Sam" Law Under Fire, American Lawyer 106 (January/
February 1992).
88. See notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text.
89. The State of New York has enacted both post- and pre-judgment remedies to
insure the availability of a criminal's assets, provides for financial aid to crime victims, per-
mits orders for restitution at sentencing, and allows for "forfeiture of proceeds and instru-
mentalities of crime." Brief for the Petitioner, at LEXIS 22, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S Ct 501, No. 90-1059, October
Term, 1990 (1991).
90. From the enactment of the statue in 1977 through October 1988 five escrow ac-
counts were established (the same victim accounting for three of the accounts) with the
Board actually paying escrow funds to the victims of only one criminal. "Brief for Petitioner
at LEXIS 11."
91. A revised statute may still be considered underinclusive because it does not aid
all victims of crime, but is limited to only those that happen to be the victims of a criminal
who profits from his crimes. Id at LEXIS 21.
92. A statute may still be considered overinclusive if that statute is not sufficiently
specific in defining "criminal." Id at LEXIS 24. See also note 42 and accompanying text.
93. 112 S Ct 859 (1992).
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Victims Board was the proceeds from the book "Stranger in Two
Worlds." 4 The book, written by convicted murderess Jean Harris,
describes, in addition to her life in prison, her recollections of the
death of Dr. Herman Tarnower, the Scarsdale Diet Doctor. Jean
Harris had assigned the proceeds of the book to the non-profit cor-
poration, Children of Bedford. 5 The New York Court of Appeals
had concluded, following a strict scrutiny analysis, that Section
632-a was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of a
victim's right to compensation from profits earned by the crimi-
nal.9 Upon remand from the Supreme Court and subsequent rear-
gument, the Court of Appeals of New York reversed their
decision. 7
In reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in the subject case,
the New York Legislature enacted, and Governor Mario Cuomo
signed into law on August 13, 1992, Senate Bill 21017,98 an act that
provides for the repeal and replacement of the "Son of Sam" law
in effect at the time of the instant decision. 9 In contrasting the
two acts, it is apparent that the New York Legislature made signif-
icant changes to section 632-a in the hope that the new act will
survive constitutional challenges. First, the newly enacted law ex-
pands to encompass profits of crime, rather than being limited to
the proceeds of "storytelling." ' The new act then defines "profits
from the crime."101 Also, the act narrows the scope of application
94. Jean Harris, Stranger in Two Worlds (MacMillan, Inc. 1986).
95. Children of Bedford, Inc. v Petromelis, 77 NY2d 713, 721, 573 NE2d 541 (1991).
96. Children of Bedford, 573 NE2d at 545.
97. In the Matter of Children of Bedford Inc. et. al. v Angelo Petromelis, et. al., 79
NY2d 972, 592 NE2d 796 (1992).
98. Senate Bill No 21017, 1992 Regular Session, Ch 618 (1992).
99. Senate Bill No 21017, Ch 618 (cited in note 98).
100. Senate Bill No 21017, Ch 618 (to be codified at §632-a(2)(a))(cited in note 98).
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity which
knowingly contracts for, pays, or agrees to pay, any profit from a crime, as defined in
subdivision one of this section, to a person charged with or convicted of that crime
shall give written notice to the Crime Victims Board of the payment, or obligation to
pay as soon as practicable after discovering that the payment or intended payment is
a profit from a crime.
Id.
See note 4 for the corresponding provision in the 1977 law.
101. Id at a(1)(b). §632-a(1)(b) reads:
'Profits from the crime' means (I) any property obtained through or income gener-
ated from the commission of a crime of which the defendant was convicted; (II) any
property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion or exchange of
proceeds of a crime, including any gain realized by such sale, conversion or exchange;
and (III) any property which the defendant obtained or income generated as a result
of having committed the crime, including any assets obtained through the use of
1993
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by defining of the term "crime, '"102 while expanding the definition
of "crime victim.' 0 3 Additionally, the new section 632-a provides
for restitution in criminal suits, extends the one year statute of
limitations for bringing suit for damages against the criminal to
seven years, and creates a three year statute of limitations, running
from the time the profit-making is discovered, for victims to sue
for crime profits."0 4
In light of the Simon & Schuster decision, other states are likely
to follow suit and re-draft their current laws. With the Court leav-
ing so little room for argument on the issue of content-based re-
strictions, any renewed effort to restrict and control those profits
earned by criminals solely from the sales of their stories appears
futile. This futility appears to have been acknowledged by the New
York Legislature; they chose to proceed by defining profits of
crime and then attaching all such profits. Thus, the next "Son of
Sam" controversy the Supreme Court faces will likely be over in-
terpreting the definition of "profits of crime."
Carol M. Grebb
unique knowledge obtained during the commission of, or in preparation for the com-
mission of the crime, as well as any property obtained by or income generated from
the sale, conversion or exchange of such property and any gain realized by such sale,
conversion or exchange.
Id.
102. Id at a(1)(a). "'Crime' means any felony defined in the penal law or any other
chapter of the consolidated laws of the state." Id. See note 7 to contrast the two sections..
103. Senate Bill No 21017, Ch 618 §632-a(1)(c) (cited in note 98).
'Crime victim' means (I) the victim of the offense; (II) the representative of a crime
victim as defined in subdivision six of section six hundred twenty-one of this article;
(III) a good samaritan as defined in section six hundred twenty-one of this article;
(IV) the Crime Victims Board or other governmental agency that has received an
application for or provided financial assistance or compensation to the victim.
Id.
104. Id.
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